Special operations and the intelligence system / by Lawerence E Cline
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TextPublication details: 2005Subject(s):
In:
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence Vol. 18, No 4, Winter 2005-2006, pp.575-592 (117)Summary: The U.S. Dept of Defense has a clear preference for the "Afghanistan model" in which a small number of special operations forces (SOF), backed by an extensive support structure, destroy terrorist targets and their infrastructure. This kind of model relies heavily on the internal intelligence resources of the SOF units themselves as well as the wider intelligence structure. Notes that a single twelve man Special Forces A Team may require input from virtually all America's national intelligence agencies. Using the Afghanistan example this article considers how well intelligence integration has worked in practice and looks at the requirements to achieve effective information flows in both directions.
| Item type | Current library | Call number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Journal Article | Mindef Library & Info Centre On-Shelf | XX(19127.1) (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 1 | Not for loan | 19127-1001 |
The U.S. Dept of Defense has a clear preference for the "Afghanistan model" in which a small number of special operations forces (SOF), backed by an extensive support structure, destroy terrorist targets and their infrastructure. This kind of model relies heavily on the internal intelligence resources of the SOF units themselves as well as the wider intelligence structure. Notes that a single twelve man Special Forces A Team may require input from virtually all America's national intelligence agencies. Using the Afghanistan example this article considers how well intelligence integration has worked in practice and looks at the requirements to achieve effective information flows in both directions.
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