Assymetric verification: an option for future arms limitation/ John D. Maurer

By:

MAURER John D

Material type: Text

TextPublication details: 2024Subject(s):

In: Orbis, Volume 68, Issue 3, Summer 2024, pg. 383-405Summary: One way to verify future arms control agreements without on-site inspections would be to rely on counting rules verified by national technical intelligence.

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Item type	Current library	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode
Journal Article	Mindef Library & Info Centre Journals	ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Not for loan

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One way to verify future arms control agreements without on-site inspections would be to rely on counting rules verified by national technical intelligence.

GEOPOLITICAL COMPETITION, ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, NEWARTICLS

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