Do autocrats need a foreign enemy?: evidence from fortress russia/ Henry E. Hale and Adam C. Lenton
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TextPublication details: 2024Subject(s):
In:
International Security, Volume 49, Number 1, Summer 2024, pg. 9-50Summary: This article argues that conventional thinking suggests that autocrats need enemies and have incentives to create them. This is addressed by examining the case of Russia.
| Item type | Current library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Journal Article | Mindef Library & Info Centre Journals | FOREIGN POLICY (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not for loan |
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This article argues that conventional thinking suggests that autocrats need enemies and have incentives to create them. This is addressed by examining the case of Russia.
FOREIGN POLICY, FOREIGN THREAT, NATO, NEWARTICLS
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