Deterrence by delivery of arms: NATO and the war in Ukraine/ Amir Lupovici
Material type: TextPublication details: 2023Subject(s): Online resources: In: Contemporary Security Policy, Vol 44, No 4, October 2023, page: 624-641Summary: During the course of the war in Ukraine, various actors have employed a unique type of deterrence by denial: namely, the threat to deliver arms. NATO leaders have committed—through rhetoric and deeds—to continue to deliver weapons to Ukraine if Russia escalated the war in order to deny Russian success. Not only is this type of strategy undertheorized, but it also challenges the distinction between direct and extended deterrence that has been central to deterrence scholarship. In deterrence by delivery of arms, the patron deters not by threatening to fight or deploy forces, but by committing to send weapons.Item type | Current library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
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Journal Article | Mindef Library & Info Centre Journals | NATO (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not for loan |
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During the course of the war in Ukraine, various actors have employed a unique type of deterrence by denial: namely, the threat to deliver arms. NATO leaders have committed—through rhetoric and deeds—to continue to deliver weapons to Ukraine if Russia escalated the war in order to deny Russian success. Not only is this type of strategy undertheorized, but it also challenges the distinction between direct and extended deterrence that has been central to deterrence scholarship. In deterrence by delivery of arms, the patron deters not by threatening to fight or deploy forces, but by committing to send weapons.
NATO, UKRAINE, RUSSIA, NEWARTICLS
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