Normal view MARC view ISBD view

Towards nuclear stewardship with China/ Hans Binnendijk & David C. Gompert

By:

BINNENDIJK Hans

Contributor(s):

GOMPERT David C

Material type: Text

TextPublication details: 2023Subject(s):

Online resources:

Click here for full text

In: Survival Vol.65, No.1, February-March 2023, pp.7-20 (106)Summary: With the rising risk of complex crises and military escalation in the Pacific region, the United States should invite China into a process of nuclear restraint and confidence-building, which we call 'nuclear stewardship'. This process could start with a joint bilateral declaration that neither superpower would use nuclear weapons first against the other or its formal allies. This would acknowledge that neither side could gain by striking first with a nuclear device. This declaration could be the leading edge of a broader set of discussions on strategic stability and eventual implementation of confidence-building measures designed to enhance mutual understanding and trust in the US-Chinese nuclear relationship.

Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.

Average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)

Holdings
Item type	Current library	Call number	Copy number	Status	Date due	Barcode
Journal Article	Mindef Library & Info Centre Journals	CHINA (Browse shelf(Opens below))	1	Not for loan		69447.1001

Browsing Mindef Library & Info Centre shelves, Shelving location: Journals Close shelf browser (Hides shelf browser)

Previous								Next
Previous	CHINA China and the international debate on no first use of nuclear weapons/	CHINA A new era for Chinese military logistics/	CHINA Paving the digital silk road with the Shanghai cooperation organisation/	CHINA Towards nuclear stewardship with China/	CHINA Bayspeak: narrating China's greater bay area/	CHINA Top-level design and enlarged diplomacy: foreign and security policymaking in Xi Jinping's China/	CHINA Measuring and forecasting the rise of China: reality over image/	Next

With the rising risk of complex crises and military escalation in the Pacific region, the United States should invite China into a process of nuclear restraint and confidence-building, which we call 'nuclear stewardship'. This process could start with a joint bilateral declaration that neither superpower would use nuclear weapons first against the other or its formal allies. This would acknowledge that neither side could gain by striking first with a nuclear device. This declaration could be the leading edge of a broader set of discussions on strategic stability and eventual implementation of confidence-building measures designed to enhance mutual understanding and trust in the US-Chinese nuclear relationship.

CHINA, USA, TAIWAN, WMD, WARFARE, POLICY

There are no comments on this title.

to post a comment.