To disclose or deceive? sharing secret information between aligned states/ Melinda Haas and Keren Yarhi-Milo
Material type: TextPublication details: 2020Subject(s): Online resources: In: International Security Vol 45, No 3, Winter 2020/21, pp.122-161 (68)Summary: Why do aligned states sometimes disclose secret information about their military plans to use force, whereas other times they choose to deceive their partners? This article seek to developing and testing a new theory that explains how states choose an information-sharing strategy when thinking about using military force.Item type | Current library | Call number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
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Journal Article | Mindef Library & Info Centre Journals | INFORMATION SHARING (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 1 | Not for loan | 66182.1001 |
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INFO WARFARE Jamming efficacy of communications links/ | INFO WARFARE Autonomous systems and moral de-skilling: beyond good and evil in the emergent battlespaces of the twenty-first century/ | INFORMATION AGE Finding the right answer: adapting military intelligence to the information age / | INFORMATION SHARING To disclose or deceive? sharing secret information between aligned states/ | INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY The law of unintended consequences/ | INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY Next exit joint information environment/ | INFORMATION WARFARE War and PC/ |
Why do aligned states sometimes disclose secret information about their military plans to use force, whereas other times they choose to deceive their partners? This article seek to developing and testing a new theory that explains how states choose an information-sharing strategy when thinking about using military force.
MILITARY, STRATEGY
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