Resident terrorist groups, military aid, and moral hazard: further empirical analysis/ Wukki Kim, Dong Li & Todd Sandler
Material type:
TextPublication details: 2021Subject(s): Online resources:
In:
Defence and Peace Economics: Vol 32, No. 1, January 2021, pp.1-17Summary: The current article improves on the empirics of the pioneering article by showing that the moral-hazard concerns extend to other major donors - the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Additionally, military assistance given by a collective of countries to host countries greatly reduces the moral hazard but does not eliminate it. Moreover, policy alignment or affinity between a major donor and the host aid-recipient country does not generally augment resident terrorist groups' survival.
| Item type | Current library | Call number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Journal Article | Mindef Library & Info Centre Journals | TERRRORISM (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 1 | Not for loan | 65949-1001 |
Browsing Mindef Library & Info Centre shelves, Shelving location: Journals Close shelf browser (Hides shelf browser)
The current article improves on the empirics of the pioneering article by showing that the moral-hazard concerns extend to other major donors - the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Additionally, military assistance given by a collective of countries to host countries greatly reduces the moral hazard but does not eliminate it. Moreover, policy alignment or affinity between a major donor and the host aid-recipient country does not generally augment resident terrorist groups' survival.
There are no comments on this title.
Log in to your account to post a comment.