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Deterring Cyber Coercion: the exaggerated problem of attribution/ David Blagden

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BLAGDEN David

Material type: Text

TextPublication details: 2020Subject(s):

CYBER -- STRATEGY

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In: Survival: Vol.62, No.1, February - March 2020, pp.131-148 (106)Summary: The political interests being advanced by a cyber attack will often make the identity of the aggressor clear, even if the origin of the attack itself cannot be readily traced via technical means.The prominence of deterrence by punishment in Western cyber strategy has grown in line with capabilities and understanding. The 2011 cyberdefence strategies of the United States and United Kingdom - the two most capable Western cyber powers - did not mention retaliation, although both referred to deterrence and dwelt extensively on hardening and resilience.

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Item type	Current library	Call number	Copy number	Status	Date due	Barcode
Journal Article	Mindef Library & Info Centre Journals	CYBER (Browse shelf(Opens below))	1	Not for loan		64903-1001

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The political interests being advanced by a cyber attack will often make the identity of the aggressor clear, even if the origin of the attack itself cannot be readily traced via technical means.The prominence of deterrence by punishment in Western cyber strategy has grown in line with capabilities and understanding. The 2011 cyberdefence strategies of the United States and United Kingdom - the two most capable Western cyber powers - did not mention retaliation, although both referred to deterrence and dwelt extensively on hardening and resilience.

CYBERSEC, USA, UK, RESILIENCE, STRATEGY

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