Securing compliance with arms control agreements/ Susan Koch and Thomas Scheber
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TextPublication details: 2019Subject(s): Online resources:
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Comparative Strategy Vol.38, No.1, 2019, pp.1-87 (113)Summary: This report goes one step further by not only explaining why some countries or leaders chose not to comply, but also what lessons we have, or we should have, learned from these historical case studies to apply to today's compliance concerns. The cases studied in this report vary in antagonists, interests and objectives of the parties, time periods, agreements transgressed, military capabilities subject to limits, types of violations, evasion tactics, enforcement measures, means to resist cheating penalties, and outcomes. One case deals primarily with conventional forces, two with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, and one with a non-offensive capability (an illegal radar).
| Item type | Current library | Call number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Journal Article | Mindef Library & Info Centre Journals | ARMS CONTROL (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 1 | Not for loan | 64857-1001 |
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This report goes one step further by not only explaining why some countries or leaders chose not to comply, but also what lessons we have, or we should have, learned from these historical case studies to apply to today's compliance concerns. The cases studied in this report vary in antagonists, interests and objectives of the parties, time periods, agreements transgressed, military capabilities subject to limits, types of violations, evasion tactics, enforcement measures, means to resist cheating penalties, and outcomes. One case deals primarily with conventional forces, two with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, and one with a non-offensive capability (an illegal radar).
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