Just how important are "hearts and minds" anyway? : counterinsurgency goes to the polls / Raphael S Cohen.
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Journal of Strategic Studies Vol 37 No 4, August 2014, pp.609-636 (98)Summary: Hearts and minds has, at least since the Malayan Emergency, been presented as a fundamentally important aspect of successful counterinsurgency, and the concept is integrated in the US military's counterinsurgency manual. However this article argues that there is little evidence to support hearts-and-minds claims, and says that polling data from Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan suggest hearts-and-minds may be a result rather than a cause of counterinsurgency success. Considers the implications of this for the relative importance attached to popular support in counterinsurgency strategy.
| Item type | Current library | Call number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Journal Article | Mindef Library & Info Centre Journals | INSURGENCY & COUNTERINSURGENCY (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 1 | Not for loan | 44167-1001 |
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Hearts and minds has, at least since the Malayan Emergency, been presented as a fundamentally important aspect of successful counterinsurgency, and the concept is integrated in the US military's counterinsurgency manual. However this article argues that there is little evidence to support hearts-and-minds claims, and says that polling data from Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan suggest hearts-and-minds may be a result rather than a cause of counterinsurgency success. Considers the implications of this for the relative importance attached to popular support in counterinsurgency strategy.
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