New challenges and old concepts : understanding 21st century insurgency / Steven Metz.
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Parameters : Vol XLI No 4, Winter 2011-2012, pp.104-115 (83)Summary: Originally published in the Winter 2007-08 issue of Parameters. Discusses what the United States should be doing under the label "counterinsurgency". Argues that models indicated by Galula and Nagl may not be relevant outside colonial experience, and concludes the USA should recognise there is no single answer, that there are different insurgency environments, that if and when the U.S. does get involved it does not do so alone, and acknowledge that successful counterinsurgency will require involvement of multiple government agencies as well as the military.
| Item type | Current library | Call number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Journal Article | Mindef Library & Info Centre Journals | INSURGENCY & COUNTERINSURGENCY (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 1 | Not for loan | 43204-1001 |
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| INSURGENCY & COUNTERINSURGENCY Counterinsurgency force ratio : strategic utility or nominal necessity / | INSURGENCY & COUNTERINSURGENCY Taking advantage of insurgencies : effective policies of state-sponsorship / | INSURGENCY & COUNTERINSURGENCY Neo-classical counterinsurgency / | INSURGENCY & COUNTERINSURGENCY New challenges and old concepts : understanding 21st century insurgency / | INSURGENCY & COUNTERINSURGENCY A strategy of tactics : population-centric COIN and the Army / | INSURGENCY & COUNTERINSURGENCY Countering regional insurgencies : a process not an event / | INSURGENCY & COUNTERINSURGENCY Paths to victory / |
Originally published in the Winter 2007-08 issue of Parameters. Discusses what the United States should be doing under the label "counterinsurgency". Argues that models indicated by Galula and Nagl may not be relevant outside colonial experience, and concludes the USA should recognise there is no single answer, that there are different insurgency environments, that if and when the U.S. does get involved it does not do so alone, and acknowledge that successful counterinsurgency will require involvement of multiple government agencies as well as the military.
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