Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: learning to eat soup with a knife / John A. Nagl.

By: Material type: TextTextPublication details: Westport, Conn. USA: Praeger Publishers, 2002.Description: xxi, 249pISBN:
  • 0275976955 (hbk.):
Subject(s): Summary: Argues that the British army successfully adapted its counterinsurgency doctrine and practice during the 12 years of the Malayan Emergency, whereas the US Army did not achieve such changes in 25 years of fighting in Southeast Asia from 1950 to 1975. Suggests reasons why this should have been so, and concludes that armed forces will need to be much more adaptable if they are to succeed in the internal wars of the current era.
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Argues that the British army successfully adapted its counterinsurgency doctrine and practice during the 12 years of the Malayan Emergency, whereas the US Army did not achieve such changes in 25 years of fighting in Southeast Asia from 1950 to 1975. Suggests reasons why this should have been so, and concludes that armed forces will need to be much more adaptable if they are to succeed in the internal wars of the current era.

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