Myth and the small war tradition : reassessing the discourse of British counter-insurgency / David Martin Jones and M L R Smith.
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Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol 34 No 3, July 2013, pp. 436-464 (97)Summary: Britain has a reputation for effectiveness in small wars. This article suggests that this is a myth created by external, particularly American, commentators and not one to which the British military itself generally subscribed. Instead the authors propose that it is political will rather than military technique which determines success in counterinsurgency. Having demonstrated the myth the authors then question the validity of comments which suggest that Britain is not sustaining its counterinsurgency success.
| Item type | Current library | Call number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Journal Article | Mindef Library & Info Centre Journals | INSURGENCY & COUNTERINSURGENCY (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 1 | Not for loan | 41093-1001 |
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Britain has a reputation for effectiveness in small wars. This article suggests that this is a myth created by external, particularly American, commentators and not one to which the British military itself generally subscribed. Instead the authors propose that it is political will rather than military technique which determines success in counterinsurgency. Having demonstrated the myth the authors then question the validity of comments which suggest that Britain is not sustaining its counterinsurgency success.
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