The influence of military materiel on tactics and strategy in counterinsurgency: a case of British Malaya/ Eric Jardine
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TextPublication details: 2011Subject(s):
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Defence Studies Vol.11, No 4, December 2011, pp.636-656 (105)Summary: This article presents an inductive case analysis of the British counterinsurgency in Malaya, emphasizing the tactical and strategical aspects of the campaign. It also describes the manner in which British forces adapted to the insurgent's tactical programme. Suggests that increasing the numbers of troops and the amount of equipment deployed (as America did in Vietnam and Afghanistan) may actually be counterproductive.
| Item type | Current library | Call number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Journal Article | Mindef Library & Info Centre Journals | INSURGENCY & COUNTERINSURGENCY (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 1 | Not for loan | 37263-1001 |
This article presents an inductive case analysis of the British counterinsurgency in Malaya, emphasizing the tactical and strategical aspects of the campaign. It also describes the manner in which British forces adapted to the insurgent's tactical programme. Suggests that increasing the numbers of troops and the amount of equipment deployed (as America did in Vietnam and Afghanistan) may actually be counterproductive.
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