Borneo, counter-insurgency and war termination/ Christopher Tuck
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TextPublication details: 2010Subject(s):
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Defence Studies Vol.10 Issue 1-2, March-June 2010, pp.106-125 (105)Summary: This article makes two points the quality of counter insurgency, first using Britain's undeclared 1963-1966 war against Indonesia as a starting point, this paper argues that whilst tactical and operational level military success in COIN is clearly desirable, even significant military success cannot gurantee successful war termination. Second, the successful termination of COIN campaigns is fundamentally an issue of grand strategy.
| Item type | Current library | Call number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Journal Article | Mindef Library & Info Centre Journals | BORNEO (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 1 | Not for loan | 37235-1001 |
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This article makes two points the quality of counter insurgency, first using Britain's undeclared 1963-1966 war against Indonesia as a starting point, this paper argues that whilst tactical and operational level military success in COIN is clearly desirable, even significant military success cannot gurantee successful war termination. Second, the successful termination of COIN campaigns is fundamentally an issue of grand strategy.
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