Fighting to the death : Mumbai and the future fidayeen threat / Adam Dolnik.
Material type: TextPublication details: 2010Subject(s): In: RUSI Journal Vol 155 no 2, April-May 2010, pp.60-68Summary: Reviews in some detail the lessons to be drawn from the coordinated terrorist attacks that took place in Mumbai 26 Novermber 2008 and lasted some sixty hours. Fidayeen assaults are in essence suicide missions in whichthe perpetrators objective is to achieve maximum death and injuries continuing the attack until they themselves are killed or otherwise stopped. In Mumbai the terrorists were aremd with AK-47s, grenades, improvised explosives, and were in constant contact (via mobile phone and VOIP) with external handlers who provided practical and psychological support and who were also able to follow events in real time using internet resources and news media. Lessons include the need for suitable equipment and training among response teams (police, military and others); importance of coordination, cooperation and intelligence sharing among responders; recognition of the importance of the comms link between terrorist and controller and the effect this will have on negotiation opportunities; the disruptive effects of random IEDs (in the case of Mumbai bombs on timers were left in taxis); and the necessity to adjust responses when faced with flexible attackers.Item type | Current library | Call number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
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Journal Article | Mindef Library & Info Centre Journals | TERRORISM & COUNTERTERRORISM (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 1 | Not for loan | 33142-1001 |
Reviews in some detail the lessons to be drawn from the coordinated terrorist attacks that took place in Mumbai 26 Novermber 2008 and lasted some sixty hours. Fidayeen assaults are in essence suicide missions in whichthe perpetrators objective is to achieve maximum death and injuries continuing the attack until they themselves are killed or otherwise stopped. In Mumbai the terrorists were aremd with AK-47s, grenades, improvised explosives, and were in constant contact (via mobile phone and VOIP) with external handlers who provided practical and psychological support and who were also able to follow events in real time using internet resources and news media. Lessons include the need for suitable equipment and training among response teams (police, military and others); importance of coordination, cooperation and intelligence sharing among responders; recognition of the importance of the comms link between terrorist and controller and the effect this will have on negotiation opportunities; the disruptive effects of random IEDs (in the case of Mumbai bombs on timers were left in taxis); and the necessity to adjust responses when faced with flexible attackers.
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