How not to do post-invasion : lessons learned from US decision making in Iraq (2002-2008) / Charles-Philippe David.
Material type:
TextPublication details: 2010Subject(s):
In:
Defense and Security Analysis Vol 26 No 1, March 2010, pp.31-63 (94)Summary: The U.S. led invasion of Iraq and its aftrmath stem not from a conspiracy but from "a monumental blunder produced by a specific set of historic conditions and a fatally flawed decision-making process". This article is a scathing review of how it all went so wrong.
| Item type | Current library | Call number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Journal Article | Mindef Library & Info Centre Journals | UNITED STATES (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 1 | Not for loan | 31157-1001 |
The U.S. led invasion of Iraq and its aftrmath stem not from a conspiracy but from "a monumental blunder produced by a specific set of historic conditions and a fatally flawed decision-making process". This article is a scathing review of how it all went so wrong.
There are no comments on this title.
Log in to your account to post a comment.