Waging counterinsurgency in Algeria : a French point of view / Philippe Francois
Material type: TextPublication details: 2008Subject(s): In: Military Review Vol 88 No 5, September-October 2008, pp.56-67 (81)Summary: Review of France's counterinsurgency war in Algeria from 1954-1962 and some of the lessons learned. The conflict is estimated to have caused at least 300,000 deaths. Perceived intially as an internal policing matter events turned into full conflict to which French military responded harshly. Concludes that clear political objectives are essential, that force must be balanced with hearts-and-minds measures, and that in an insurgency it must be accepted that the old order cannot be reinstated.Item type | Current library | Call number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
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Journal Article | Mindef Library & Info Centre Journals | INSURGENCY & COUNTERINSURGENCY (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 1 | Not for loan | 25429-1001 |
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Review of France's counterinsurgency war in Algeria from 1954-1962 and some of the lessons learned. The conflict is estimated to have caused at least 300,000 deaths. Perceived intially as an internal policing matter events turned into full conflict to which French military responded harshly. Concludes that clear political objectives are essential, that force must be balanced with hearts-and-minds measures, and that in an insurgency it must be accepted that the old order cannot be reinstated.
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