Unequal contest : Iranian nuclear proliferation between economic and value symmetry / Mani Parsi and Steve A Yetiv
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Contemporary Security Policy Vol 29, No 2, August 2008, pp.332-337 (104)Summary: Considers why Iran is not agreeing to UN demands that it give up its uranium enrichment programme. Sanctions intended to persuade Iran to comply with the demands are likely to fail because Iran places a higher value on the programme than on what sanctions are obliging ti to forego. Recommends a reassessment of the various carrots and sticks to identify enticements sufficiently tempting and threats sufficiently credible to make cooperation a viable proposition.
| Item type | Current library | Call number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Journal Article | Mindef Library & Info Centre Journals | IRAN (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 1 | Not for loan | 24961-1001 |
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Considers why Iran is not agreeing to UN demands that it give up its uranium enrichment programme. Sanctions intended to persuade Iran to comply with the demands are likely to fail because Iran places a higher value on the programme than on what sanctions are obliging ti to forego. Recommends a reassessment of the various carrots and sticks to identify enticements sufficiently tempting and threats sufficiently credible to make cooperation a viable proposition.
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