Security dilemmas and signalling during the North Korean nuclear standoff
YONGHO Kim
Security dilemmas and signalling during the North Korean nuclear standoff - 2005
A research supported by the 2004 Yonsei Research Fund, Peace Index Project, and BK21 Northeast Asian Peace Project of Yonsei University. This article is a study of North Korea's foreign policy behaviour as a design to project a desired image of a rogue state that is prepared to engage in a high level of risk-taking if Washington and Seoul impose sanctions or refuse concessions. The study signifies that Pyongyang's militant commentaries are not accompanied by actual provocation. In some cases, it even seems that such announcements signal a willingness to negotiate.
KOREA--SECURITY DILEMMAS
NORTH KOREA--FOREIGN POLICY
KOREA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--UNITED STATES
NORTH KOREA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--SOUTH KOREA
Security dilemmas and signalling during the North Korean nuclear standoff - 2005
A research supported by the 2004 Yonsei Research Fund, Peace Index Project, and BK21 Northeast Asian Peace Project of Yonsei University. This article is a study of North Korea's foreign policy behaviour as a design to project a desired image of a rogue state that is prepared to engage in a high level of risk-taking if Washington and Seoul impose sanctions or refuse concessions. The study signifies that Pyongyang's militant commentaries are not accompanied by actual provocation. In some cases, it even seems that such announcements signal a willingness to negotiate.
KOREA--SECURITY DILEMMAS
NORTH KOREA--FOREIGN POLICY
KOREA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--UNITED STATES
NORTH KOREA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--SOUTH KOREA